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ABSTRACT
Techniques described herein provide innovation directed to authenticating a device.
An intrinsic attribute of the device can be received. The intrinsic attribute is a unique
attribute that can be measured from the device. The device can be identified by looking up
the intrinsic attribute in a distributed database. A match can be determined between the
intrinsic attribute and a stored intrinsic attribute in the distributed database. If there is a
match, the device is confirmed as authentic. Previously available blockchain systems do
not employ abilities to track products beyond mere custody information.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
Many traditional storage systems are centralized storage systems. In such storage
systems, one or more servers serve as a central repository that stores information. The
central repository is accessible to various client devices. The central repository is often
managed by a business entity that typically charges a fee to access the central repository.
In some instances, there is a transaction fee associated with each transaction. For example,
there is often a transaction fee for writing information that pertains to a new transaction,
and another transaction fee for accessing information related to an old transaction. As such,
centralized storage systems tend to be relatively expensive.
Some centralized storage systems are susceptible to unauthorized data
manipulation. For example, in some instances, a malicious actor may gain unauthorized
access to a central repository and may surreptitiously change information stored in the
central repository. In some scenarios, the unauthorized changes may not be detected. As
such, the information stored in a centralized repository is at risk of being inaccurate.
In a distributed ledger environment (blockchain), the nodes (e.g., network routers
and other devices) are ‘approved’ members of a blockchain while ‘unapproved’ nodes are
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excluded. In blockchain parlance, node admission is via Proof of Authority in the smart
contracts; e.g., the blockchain is hosting a distributed certificate authority that is censorship
resistance because its policies and actions are automated via the smart contracts running in
the network. Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) mesh overlays can implement secure endto-end routing and cryptographic message protection. SSL/VPN meshes are also possible
in a PKI environment. With the blockchain, novel new addressability mechanisms arise.
The concept of building a new blockchain on the fly for a temporary purpose also has
appealing applications. Interposing routers (e.g. devices from certain competitors or
countries, etc.) are oblivious to these networks, which may be persistent or temporary or
intent-driven. Figure 1, below, is a schematic diagram of a distributed ledger environment.

Figure 1
Background
Methods and systems are described to locate (geospatial, travel time, jurisdictional,
etc.) member nodes of a blockchain network and map them across all nodes in the
blockchain network, with the desirable properties of deterministic, non-interactive
algorithms such that all of the nodes arrive at the same state conclusion (consensus) in
parallel. This is achieved through smart-contract transactions where nodes publish enough
information as transactions to a blockchain ledger, which is verifiable by all other nodes
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such that they independently compute the same map with ‘pins’ placed on it for nodes.
This ‘registration’ data set is signed by each node using its public/private key pair
registered in the blockchain (which can be issued and verified by a distributed certificate
authority (Dist.CA)).
Methods and systems can also draw lines between the ‘pins’ (nodes) in which the
lines may represent tunnel/routing relationships in the network (e.g., IPSec tunnels).
Tunnel authentication and cryptography will be established using the well-known
public/private key pairs owned by each respective node as published in the blockchain
ledger (issued and verified by the Dist.CA). Embodiments may include Google Maps®,
Wi-Fi®/Bluetooth® signal triangulation, dynamic network telemetry tested over an
overlay network, continent, region, locale, number of desired redundant links, etc.
Methods and systems can include logic in which the network load balances each
node with a minimum redundant set of routes (high-availability) and a maximum (graph
degree) and adapts in real-time to transient nodes joining and leaving the mesh.
Independent copies of this ‘network graph’ can be maintained at each node, which can be
used (in a predictable consensus manner) in the network control plane for updating routes
in real-time in the network data plane.

General network admission control can be

facilitated via blockchain contracts (e.g., smart contracts) and leveraging Dist.CA
(equivalent to network identity).
To that end, the distributed ledger environment can include one or more source
nodes (e.g., a first source node, a second source node, and a third source node), one or more
receiver nodes (e.g., a first receiver node, a second receiver node, and a third receiver node),
various connecting nodes, and a distributed ledger copied on all the nodes (e.g., source
nodes, receiver nodes, and connecting nodes). Briefly, in various implementations, the
connecting nodes provide various communication paths between the source nodes and the
receiver nodes, and each node is configured to adjust at least a portion of the
communication paths based on their performance. Figure 2, below, illustrates such a
distributed ledger environment.
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Figure 2
During operation, a source node (e.g., the first source node) can initiate a data
transmission. In various implementations, a data transmission indicates (e.g., includes)
information related to a transaction. In some implementations, the transaction can be
between a source node and one or more receiver nodes (e.g., between the first source node
and the second receiver node). In various implementations, the transaction is recorded in
the distributed ledger at each node. As such, in various implementations, the source node
transmits the data transmission to a receiver node and the ledger records it. The data
transmission can include a set of one or more packets, or frames.
The connecting nodes can provide communication paths for the data transmission.
In some implementations, the communication paths include one or more routes that the
data transmission traverses to reach the receiver node(s). In some implementations, the
connecting nodes are connected wirelessly (e.g., via satellite(s), cellular communication,
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Wi-Fi®, etc.) in which the communication paths include wireless communication paths.
In some implementations, the connecting nodes are connected via wires (e.g., via fiberoptic cables, Ethernet, etc.) in which the communication paths include wired
communication paths. More generally, the communication paths can include wired and/or
wireless communication paths.
The distributed ledger can be generated and copied across all nodes to be in
coordination with each node on the blockchain. In some implementations, the distributed
ledger stores transactions. For example, in some implementations, the distributed ledger
stores the transaction(s) indicated by the data transmission. As such, the distributed ledger
can serve as a record of the transactions that the distributed ledger receives, validates,
and/or processes. In some implementations, each node on the blockchain stores a copy
(e.g., an instance) of the distributed ledger. As such, in some implementations, there is no
need for a centralized ledger. It’s also possible to store the information externally and have
a cryptographic method which proves the current state of the ledger to the requesting node;
e.g., a Zero Knowledge Proof of ledger state.
One or more ledger receiver nodes can receive the data transmission. In some
implementations, the various nodes on the blockchain (e.g., source nodes, receiver nodes,
and connecting nodes) are added to the blockchain and allowed access to the distributed
ledger based on a consensus determination between the existing nodes on the blockchain.
For example, a node wishing to join the blockchain can do so in response to receiving
permission to join from a threshold number/percentage (e.g., a majority) of the existing
nodes (through a consensus mechanism). In some implementations, the existing nodes
compete with each other to authorize the new node and store its associated transactions in
the distributed ledger.
The consensus mechanism can be implemented through one or more smart
contracts which specify whether a node wishing to join the blockchain is allowed to join.
This details and implements the network Proof of Authority. In examples, a request is
received from a node to join. Various conditions specified within a smart contract is
created in accordance with a rule or policy of the smart contract. If the node fulfills
conditions in accordance with fulfilling the rule or policy of the smart contract, the node is
allowed to join the blockchain. Decentralized status information for the node is updated
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when the smart contract has been fulfilled and read access to the decentralized ledger (and
its associated status information) is granted to the node. Otherwise, the node is barred from
joining the blockchain. Figure 3, below, illustrates an example of nodes being restricted
from access.

Figure 3
A source node can transmit a request to set up a communication path (e.g., a secure
tunnel) to one or more receiver nodes. In some implementations, the request can indicate
a quality of service associated with the communication path. In various implementations,
the quality of service can indicate: a time duration during which the quality of service is
applicable; a latency value that indicates an acceptable level of latency (e.g., an acceptable
transmission time) for data transmissions associated with setting up a tunnel between the
source node and the receiver node; and/or a priority level associated with data
transmissions; combinations thereof; and/or the like.
In some implementations, the blockchain can adjust the performance of at least a
portion of the communication path(s) between the source node and the receiver node(s)
based on a specified security level. For example, if a node has been barred access to the
blockchain because it does not fulfill the smart contracts specifying acceptable nodes, then
the communication path will not go through that node (because it will be unsecure).
However, if the node has been accepted into the blockchain, then traffic can be routed
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through that node, thus ensuring that only trusted nodes on the blockchain handle traffic.
In this way, the communication paths remain secure.
For example, nodes that are accepted or unaccepted in the blockchain can be filtered
through smart contracts, which control the level or type of traffic that specific nodes on the
blockchain can view, access, or modify. For example, the smart contract may specify that
a node meets the requisite level of security (for traffic with sensitive or proprietary
information) and may specify that another node does not meet security standards and
should be restricted from joining the network.
Various communication paths can be provided by the connecting nodes. In an
example, as illustrated in Figure 4 below, there are six connecting nodes that form various
communication paths. As noted previously, a communication path can provide a route for
a data transmission. Consider for the example of Figure 4 that a data transmission from
source node 20 would like to reach first receiver node 50a. However, connecting node 40a
has been deemed untrustworthy and does not fulfil the smart contract for joining or
remaining on the blockchain. The data transmission cannot reach the first receiver node
50 by traveling over communication paths 42a, 42g, and 42i through connecting nodes 40b
and 40a. Thus, in this example, the data transmission reaches the first receiver node 50a
by traveling over communication paths 42a, 42h, 42k and 42l, and through connecting
nodes 40b, 40d, and 40c. Further, the data transmission reaches the second receiver node
50b by traveling over communication paths 42a, 42h, 42k and 42m, and through connecting
nodes 40b, 40d, and 40c. Additionally, the data transmission 22 reaches the second
receiver node 30b by traveling over communication paths 42a, 42h, 42o, and 42t, and
through connecting nodes 40b, 40d and 40e.
In some implementations, the blockchain determines the route of the data
transmission 22 over the communication paths 42 and through the connecting nodes 40
based on a function of the security of the nodes. In other words, the blockchain determines
which connecting nodes 40 and communication paths 42 are to transport the data
transmission 22 based on a function of whether the nodes are trusted within the blockchain
network (e.g., allowed to join) or not.
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Figure 4

Supply Chain Device Provenance
Techniques herein provide that manufacturers can publish device information at
birth of a device into a blockchain ledger (e.g., serial number, MAC address, and birth
certificate baked into the device Trusted Platform Module (TPM)). Middle-entities (e.g.,
suppliers and distributors) can publish transfer of ownership and shipping information.
The blockchain can support dynamic network attachment. For example, when a
device attempts to join an ad hoc or stable blockchain network as a node, the ad hoc or
stable blockchain network can validate the device's information against the ledger in the
blockchain. This leverages the Dist.CA to issue an X.509 identity to device, granting it
network and blockchain access.
This can answers questions such as, but not limited to:
(i.) Does this device belong here?
(ii.) Did I buy it?
(iii.) What is the expected time of deployment?
(iv.) Was the device built by an approved manufacturer?
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(v.) What it shipped and delivered by approved vendors?
(vi.) Is it an approved device manufacturer, but purchased and owned by an
adversary?
In summary, techniques presented herein provide innovation directed to
authenticating a device. An intrinsic attribute of the device can be received. The intrinsic
attribute is a unique attribute that can be measured from the device. The device can be
identified by looking up the intrinsic attribute in a distributed database. A match can be
determined between the intrinsic attribute and a stored intrinsic attribute in the distributed
database. If there is a match, the device is confirmed as authentic.
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